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1 Introduction
A large number of experimental and field studies indicate that economic
decisions are in many cases motivated not only by material self interest, but
also by concerns for fairness. This evidence has led to the development of
several recent theoretical models that incorporate fairness as a determinant
of economic behavior (see e.g. Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000, Sobel, 2005, and Fehr
and Schmidt, 2006, for recent surveys). Alternative theoretical approaches
differ with respect to how fairness is defined. In particular, two main classes
of models can be distinguished: models that focus on distributional concerns,
and models that focus on intention-based reciprocity.1
In the distributional approach, fairness refers to the distribution of mate-
rial payoffs. Economic agents are motivated not only by their own material
gain, but also by how their payoff compares with that of other agents. Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) assume that the utility of a subject depends on the dif-
ference between his own payoff and that of other subjects, so that agents
have egalitarian preferences. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) assume that the
utility function of a subject depends on his own payoff relative to the average
overall payoff, so that agents care about their own relative status. In these
models, fairness-related preferences depend only on the final distribution of
payoffs, so that agents are not concerned about how a given distribution has
been obtained.
In the reciprocity approach, fairness refers to the intentions of other
agents. Agents derive utility from rewarding kind actions and punishing
unkind actions, even if this is costly in terms of material payoffs (e.g. Rabin,
1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004). Preferences depend on the per-
ceived kindness of an action and, therefore, on the beliefs about other agents’
intentions (why an agent has chosen a given action).2 In these models, actions
with identical outcomes may elicit different reciprocating responses depend-
ing on how they are interpreted. A key question for intention-based reci-
1In this paper we use the term reciprocity to refer to strong reciprocity, defined as the
non-strategic conditional behavior to reward kind actions, and to punish unkind actions,
even if this is costly for the reciprocating subject.
2Both distribution and intentions play a role in the models by Charness and Rabin
(2002) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006). In particular, in the theory of reciprocity by Falk
and Fishbacher (2006) the kindness of an action depends on both intentionality and the
outcome of an action, where the latter is defined as the difference in the payoffs of the
receiving and sending subjects.
2
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procity models is therefore how agents evaluate the kindness of a particular
action.
One way of assessing the kindness of an action is to compare the action
intentionally chosen with the alternative actions that could have been chosen,
thus focusing on the strategy space of the first mover. Both intentionality,
intended as free-will, and the set of alternative possibilities therefore may
contribute to define the perceived kindness of an action. This implies two
testable predictions. First, there should be no intention-based reciprocal
behavior when the action of the first mover is not chosen intentionally, for
example because it is the only available option or it is determined exoge-
nously, by a disinterested third party or by chance. Second, the perceived
kindness of an intentionally chosen action depends on the characteristics of
the alternative actions that were available to the agent but were not chosen.
At the empirical level, a first group of experime tal studies has investi-
gated the role of intention-based fairness by focusing on the first prediction,
testing the relevance of first mover’s intentionality (the so-called attribution
hypothesis). A control treatment where the sender can intentionally choose
what action to take among a set of alternatives (thus signalling her inten-
tions) is compared with a treatment where the sender cannot choose, either
because she does not have alternative options, as in McCabe et al. (2003),
or because her choice is determined randomly, as in Blount (1995) and Falk
et al. (2008). The evidence, however, is mixed, and different results are ob-
tained for positive and negative reciprocity.3 It is important to observe that
the notion of intentions investigated in this literature refers to the attribution
of first mover’s intentionality (free will).
A second group of experimental studies investigates the role of fairness
intentions by focusing on the second testable prediction, testing the rele-
vance of the alternative actions available to the first mover for the perceived
kindness of a chosen action. In these studies, the strategy space of the first
3Bolton et al. (1998) study both positive and negative reciprocal behaviour, finding
that distributional preferences are sufficient to explain observed reciprocal actions, whereas
intentions play a marginal role. Blount (1995) finds significant evidence of attribution-
based behavior only for negative reciprocity (see also Offerman, 2002). Charness (2004)
compares a standard gift-exchange game to a treatment where the wage is determined
randomly, finding that the slope of the relationship between wage and effort is significantly
higher when wages are chosen by the employer. This lends some support to the role of
intentions for positive reciprocity, although most of the reciprocal action can be attributed
to distribution. Falk et al. (2008) find that the attribution of fairness intentions has a
large and significant impact on both positive and negative reciprocal behavior.
3
Page 5 of 32
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
mover is manipulated in ways that are strategically irrelevant, but potentially
relevant for assessing the fairness of intentions (e.g. Andreoni et al., 2002,
Brandts and Sola`, 2001, Falk et al., 2003). These studies generally indicate
that the perceived fairness of intentions is sensitive to alternative strategy
spaces. Bolton and Ockenfels (2005) provide evidence that both distribu-
tional factors (relative shares) and strategy spaces (available actions) matter
for fairness behavior. Bolton et al. (2005) study experimentally the influence
of procedural fairness on the pattern of acceptance and resistance to differ-
ent outcomes, finding that choice behavior is sensitive to procedural fairness.
Overall, however, the evidence on the role of non-distributional factors for
models of social preferences is not conclusive. In particular, what determines
the perceived kindness of an action remains an open question.
In this paper we propose a new approach for assessing the relevance of
intention-based theories of fairness. We formulate and test experimentally
the hypothesis that the nature of the motivations driving an action plays
an important role for its perceived kindness and, as a consequence, for the
reciprocal response to that action. We therefore focus on the behavioral rel-
evance for reciprocity of the type of motivation driving the action an agent
is responding to. Following Falk and Fishbacher (2006), we propose a frame-
work to model explicitly the effect of the nature of motivations on reciprocal
behavior, and test the hypothesis that, for a given distributional outcome,
an action is perceived to be less kind if it is strategically motivated (driven
by the expectation of a higher future payoff), than if it is not strategically
motivated.
To clarify, consider as an example the sequential game in figure 1. Player
1 moves first, choosing between the actions K and G. If player 1 chooses
K, the game ends. If player 1 chooses G, player 2 chooses between k and g,
and the game ends. Payoffs in monetary units are indicated by the numbers
at the end of each path.4 Should G be perceived as a kind action? It
clearly depends on the strategy space of player 1. If the action K was not
available, so that the first mover could only choose G, his action would be
perceived differently (presumably, as less kind). Intentionality should matter.
Similarly, if the payoffs from choosing K were different, or there were other
alternative actions with different payoffs, intentionally choosing G could be
4The game represented in figure 1 is a simplified version of the game used in the
experiment, presented in detail in section 3. Payoffs, in particular, are intended to reflect
those available to the subjects in the experiment.
4
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perceived differently. It is important to observe, however, that the perceived
kindness of action G also depends on what player 1 believes that player
2 will do. Assume that player 1 believes that player 2 can only choose
k. Clearly, relative to the original setting, intentionally choosing action G
would be perceived differently (presumably, as more kind) by player 2. This
hypothesis, the different effect of strategic and non-strategic motivations on
the perceived kindness of an action, has received relatively little attention in
the empirical literature.
Figure 1: Sample sequential game
In order to test this hypothesis, we propose a new experimental design,
based on a symmetric gift-exchange game, that allows to manipulate the
beliefs of the first mover about the strategy space of the second mover. The
game is in two phases: in phase 1 a sender gives to a receiver; in phase 2
the same game as in phase 1 is played with reversed roles. We compare two
treatments varying the information sets of the players: in one treatment, in
phase 1 subjects are not aware of phase 2; in the second treatment, in phase
1 subjects are aware of phase 2. As a consequence, in the first treatment
giving in phase 1 cannot be strategically motivated, while in the second
treatment giving in phase 1 can be strategically motivated, i.e. driven by the
5
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expectation of a higher payoff in phase 2. The two treatments only differ with
respect to the nature of the motivations of the sender in phase 1, whereas
the distributional outcome of the sender’s action and the sender’s willingness
to give are kept constant across treatments. We expect reciprocity to be
stronger in the first treatment, where the sender’s action cannot be perceived
to be driven by strategic motivations, than in the second treatment, where
it can be perceived to be strategically motivated.
The results indicate that the type of motivation behind the choice of an
agent has a significant impact on the reciprocal behavior of other agents.
When the experimental design rules out the attribution of strategic moti-
vations, second movers’ responses are characterized by significantly stronger
positive reciprocity. This result holds both for strategy profiles and for ac-
tual decisions. In particular, at the individual level, a large number of second
movers display unconditional behavior when first movers’ can be strategically
motivated.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework of the analysis. Section 3 describes the experimental design. Sec-
tion 4 discusses the predictions to be tested. Section 5 presents the results.
Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the main findings and the implica-
tions of the analysis.
2 The Effect of Motivations on Reciprocity
In this section, following Falk and Fishbacher (2006), we propose a framework
to model the effect of the motivations of an agent on the reciprocal behavior
of another agent. Consider agent i, who is the second-mover in a one-shot
sequential interaction with agent j. The utility function of agent i is assumed
to depend not only on material payoffs (pii), but also on concerns for fairness,
represented by a distribution component and a reciprocity component. The
distribution component is expressed as the product of a distributional sensi-
tivity parameter and a distribution measure. The reciprocity component is
expressed as the product of a reciprocity parameter, a kindness term and a
reciprocation term:
Ui (pii, pij) = pii + αiδi + ρiφiσi (1)
6
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The parameter αi represents the agent’s sensitivity to distributional factors.
The distribution measure (δi) measures distributional fairness.
5 The reci-
procity parameter (ρi) represents the agent’s sensitivity to reciprocity. The
kindness term (φi) measures how kind the agent perceives the action under-
taken by the other agent. The reciprocation term (σi) measures the effect of
the reciprocal action on the other agent’s utility. Depending on the relative
size of the parameters αi and ρi, and on the specification of δi, φi, and σi,
the distributional and intention-based reciprocity components may have a
different relative weight in the agent’s preferences.
Focusing on the reciprocity component, the question we are considering
is what determines φ, the perceived kindness of an action. In Falk and
Fishbacher (2006), the kindness term depends on both the outcome of the
action and the underlying intention:
φi = ∆iϑi (2)
where the outcome term ∆i is defined as the difference between the second
mover’s payoff and the first mover’s payoff (pii−pij), and the intention factor
ϑi is a coefficient between 0 and 1 that parametrizes the intentionality of the
action, with ϑi = 1 describing a fully intentional action and ϑi < 1 an action
not fully intentional.
In this paper we argue that the motivation driving an action is also rele-
vant for its perceived kindness, so that the kindness term depends not only
on the outcome of the action (∆) and the intentionality the action (ϑ), but
also on the nature of the motivation driving the action one is responding to
(see e.g. Gouldner, 1960). Perceived kindness therefore depends not only on
whether an action produced a favorable outcome and on whether the action
was intentionally chosen, but also on the reason why the action was chosen.
The expression for the kindness term in (2) should be extended as follows:
φi = ∆iϑiµi (3)
where µ is the motivation factor, a parameter between 0 and 1 that char-
acterizes the type of motivation driving an action. We assume that an action
5In Fehr and Schmidt (1999) the utility function depends negatively on the difference
between the agent’s payoff and the payoffs of the other agent. In Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) the utility function, strictly concave in the agent’s share of total payoffs, depends
negatively on the difference between the agent’s payoff and the average payoff of other
agents.
7
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is perceived to be less kind if it is strategically motivated (µi < 1) than if it
is not (µi = 1).
6
This implies that, for a given outcome (∆) and intention (ϑ), the kindness
term φ is smaller in response to strategically motivated actions (S), than to
non-strategically motivated actions (NS):
φS < φNS (4)
or, alternatively,
φS = (1− β)φNS (5)
with β > 0. As a consequence, strategic motivation of the first mover re-
sults in weaker reciprocity of the second mover as opposed to non-strategic
motivation. The null hypothesis, that the nature of motivations is irrelevant
for perceived kindness, can be formulated as β = 0, versus the alternative
hypothesis that β > 0.7
In order to test this hypothesis, we have designed an experiment based on
a gift-exchange game under two treatments. In one treatment, the motivation
of the first mover can only be perceived as non-strategic, while in the second
treatment it can also be perceived as strategic.
3 Experimental design and procedures
Our experiment is based on a symmetric version of the gift-exchange game
(e.g. Fehr et al. 1993, Ga¨chter and Falk, 2002). As illustrated below, this
game has the advantage of making it easier for the reciprocating subject to
interpret the nature of the other player’s intentions, whose effect on reci-
procity is the core of our analysis. We start by describing the details of the
game, then present the two treatments, and finally illustrate the procedures
of the experiment.
6An action is strategically motivated if it is driven by the expectation of a higher future
payoff.
7Note that models based on guilt aversion, as in Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007), or on
trust responsiveness, as in Bacharach et al. (2007), would imply the opposite restriction
β < 0. In these models, agents derive utility from meeting others’ expectations about
them.
8
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3.1 The constituent game
We consider a two-player sequential move game that consists of two stages.
At the beginning of the game both players (A and B) are given an endowment
of 20 tokens. In the first stage, player A must choose the amount a (an
integer between 0 and 20) she wants to send to player B; the amount sent
is subtracted from the payoff of A, multiplied by 3 by the experimenter,
and added to the payoff of B. In the second stage, player B must choose
the amount (an integer between 0 and 20) she wants to send to player A;
the amount sent is subtracted from the payoff of B, multiplied by 3 by the
experimenter, and added to the payoff of A. Total payoffs are therefore 20−
a+3b for player A and 20−b+3a for player B. For each player the minimum
and maximum potential payoffs are 0 and 80 tokens, respectively.
Information feedback is as follows. At the end of stage 1, each subject is
informed of her stage payoff in tokens. At the end of stage 2 each subject is
informed of her stage payoff in tokens and of her total payoff in tokens and
in euros. At the beginning of the game subjects are informed that there is
no show-up fee, so that earnings are determined only by total payoffs, and
that the exchange rate is 2 tokens = 1 euro.
A number of features of this game are intended to facilitate the recipro-
cating subject’s interpretation of the other player’s motivation. First, sym-
metry in the endowments eliminates the confounding effects of distributional
aspects, that may arise for example in a trust game: since both players have
the same endowment, inequality aversion should not determine A’s decision
(it can motivate B’s decision but, as explained below, in exactly the same way
in the two treatments). Second, symmetry in the actions of the two players
greatly simplifies the reciprocating subject’s task of reading the other player’s
mind in order to interpret her motives. Third, the structure of the game is
extremely simple, so as to enhance the saliency of the treatment.
3.2 Treatments
The treatment variable is the information set of the players.8 In the Informa-
tion treatment (I), before playing stage 1 all subjects (A and B) are informed
that there will be a stage 2 that will be played with the same rules as in stage
8Ben-Ner et al. (2004) use a similar design, based on a two-part dictator game in which
dictators are unaware of the two-part structure, to study reciprocal behavior in a setting
where strategic investment in reputation by first movers can be ruled out.
9
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1 but with reversed roles. Therefore, this is simply a version of the standard
gift-exchange game. In the No-Information treatment (NI), only after stage
1 has ended players (A and B) are informed that there will be a stage two
where the same action will be taken with reversed roles. In this case, stage
1 is played as if it was the whole game, and stage 2 is played as a surprise
sub-game.9
The two treatments differ with respect to the motivation that may deter-
mine A’s action in stage 1. In the I-treatment, A can give tokens to B for
pure altruism, concern for efficiency, and/or because she expects that B will
reciprocate, thus increasing her own overall payoff. Player A’s motivation,
can therefore be perceived by player B, at least partially, strategically moti-
vated (that is, aimed at achieving a higher payoff through B’s reciprocating
response). In the NI-treatment, instead, A cannot give to B in order to ob-
tain something else, given that stage 1 is played as if the game should then
end. In this case player A’s motivation cannot be perceived by player B as
strategically motivated.
Note that since all players receive the same information, in stage 2 players
B are fully aware of the motivation driving players A’s actions in stage 1.
Given that in stage 2 players B have to take exactly the same action as
players A in stage 1, it is particularly simple for them to interpret the nature
of A’s motivations in each of the two treatments. Since all other conditions
are kept fixed, any differences in the reciprocating behavior of players B can
be interpreted as the effect of the differences in player A’s motivation.
It is important to observe that in both treatments the response of player
B cannot be strategic: since the game ends after player B’s action, there
is nothing “external” to be reached by her action. As a consequence, our
analysis can be interpreted as a test of an inter-personal version of the moti-
vational crowding out hypothesis: the extrinsic motivation of the first mover
may crowd-out the intrinsically motivated reciprocating behavior of the sec-
ond mover.
9Note that subjects are simply given instructions about stage 1, without any explicit
reference to the game ending thereafter, so that subjects are not in any way cheated by
the announcement of stage 2. On the other hand, there is no reason why, when playing
stage 1, subjects should expect stage 2 to follow. See the instructions in the appendix for
details.
10
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3.3 Procedures
In stage 2, when players B have to make their choice, we applied a variant of
the strategy method (henceforth SM): player B had to provide a response for
each feasible action of player A, before being informed of the actual choice of
A. This allowed us to study the responses to each possible action of A and
therefore, on the basis of responses to different actions of A, to distinguish
between unconditional altruism and conditional altruism in the strategies
of B players. It is important to observe that the specific features of the
NI-treatment, based on a surprise stage 2, imply that we cannot observe
repeatedly subjects’ reciprocating behavior over successive periods. This
makes the application of the strategy method particularly appropriate in
order to investigate reciprocal behavior within our experimental design.
After providing a response for each feasible action of player A, players B
were informed of the actual action taken by A and had to choose a response
(decision method, henceforth DM). Before players B made their choices with
the two methods (SM and DM), all players were informed that payoffs would
be determined on the basis of one of the two methods, to be selected randomly
by publicly tossing a coin. After players B had made their decisions in both
SM and DM, the method to determine the payoffs was selected on the basis
of the outcome of the coin toss.10
This procedure based on responses by players B in both strategy and
decision method allowed us to ensure that in the I-treatment players A could
choose their action in stage 1 knowing that in stage 2 players B would choose
their action having been informed of the actual action taken by A in stage 1
(thus making salient the extrinsic motivation). It also allowed us to compare
the consistency between the strategies of B players and their actual responses.
We run two sessions for each treatment, with 24 subjects participating in
each session, for a total of 96 subjects. In each of the four sessions, subjects
were randomly assigned to a computer terminal at their arrival and, before
the game started, to their role as player A or B (each subject only played
one role). In order to ensure public knowledge, instructions were distributed
and read aloud (see Appendix 1). Sample questions were distributed to en-
sure understanding of the experimental procedures. Answers were privately
checked and, if necessary, explained to the subjects, and the experiment did
not start until all subjects had answered all questions correctly.
10See Fischbacher et al. (2001) for a similar approach.
11
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4 Predictions
If subjects are purely self-interested, in both treatments players B will choose
to give zero tokens for any number of tokens received, since they are at the
terminal node and gift-giving is costly. In the I-treatment, if it is common
knowledge that all subjects are purely self-interested and rational, by back-
ward induction the optimal choice of players A is to give zero in stage one. In
the NI-treatment, the optimal choice of players A is again to give zero, since
they play as if they were at the terminal node of the game. Therefore, in
both treatments the sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome is for all players
to give zero: player A will choose a = 0 and player B will choose b = 0 for
any a.
If subjects’ preferences are characterized by concerns for fairness (deter-
mined by distributional factors or intention-based reciprocity), in both treat-
ments the response of players B should depend positively on the amount sent
by player A:
Hypothesis 1 - If preferences are characterized by a concern for
fairness, the amount sent by B in stage 2 is positively related to
the amount sent by A in stage 1.
Our operational definition of fairness-dependent behavior is based on
the Spearman correlation coefficient between the amounts sent by A and
B, rather than Pearson correlations, so as to avoid restricting the attention
to linear dependence.11
Note that if some players are motivated by concerns for fairness, and this
is common knowledge, then the predictions for players A will differ in two
treatments. In particular, players A should send more in the I-treatment,
since they might be motivated not only by pure generosity or efficiency, but
also by the expectation that a reciprocating response could increase their own
payoff. This is an additional reason why the focus of our analysis is on the
responses of players B in the strategy method: this allows us to compare the
two treatments, characterized by different motivations of first movers, while
controlling for differences in the sending behavior of players A. Nevertheless,
we also analyse reciprocity in the actual responses of players B (decision
method) in order to provide a check of the robustness of our results.
11In order to enable a comparison of the two indicators, we also report Pearson correla-
tion coefficients.
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Let us turn to the main hypothesis of the experiment. In a relationship
between a first mover and a second mover, if the action of the first mover can
be strategically motivated, it is perceived by the second mover as less kind,
so that positive reciprocity is elicited less strongly than if the action is not
perceived to be strategically motivated. In our design, if the second mover
is motivated only by distributional fairness, or the perceived kindness of an
action does not depend on motivations, the positive relationship between
the amounts sent by A in stage 1 and by B in stage 2 should be the same
across treatments. On the contrary, if the motivation of an action matters for
its perceived kindness, such positive relationship should be different across
treatments.
Hypothesis 2 - Effect of motivations on reciprocity: The
positive relationship between the amounts sent by B in stage 2
and by A in stage 1 should be stronger in the NI-treatment than
in the I-treatment.
Table 1 summarizes the predictions of alternative fairness models for the
two treatments. The key hypothesis to be tested is that the reciprocating
behavior of the second mover should be stronger in the NI-treatment, where
strategic motivations of the first mover can be ruled out, than in the I-
treatment, where strategic motivations of the first mover cannot be ruled
out.
Table 1: Summary of predictions for player B
Model NI-treatment I-treatment
Standard prediction b = 0 as in NI
Distribution-based fairness b rises with a as in NI
Intention-based reciprocity:
Only outcome b rises with a as in NI
Outcome and attribution b rises with a as in NI
Outcome, attribution and motivations b rises with a b rises with a but less
Note: See discussion in section 4.
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5 Results
The experiment was conducted in the Experimental Economics Laboratory
of the University of Milan Bicocca in January 2007. Participants were under-
graduate students of Economics recruited by e-mail using a list of voluntary
potential candidates. None of the subjects had participated previously in
trust or gift-exchange games. Sessions lasted approximately 45 minutes. No
show-up fee was paid and the exchange rate was 2 tokens = 1 euro. The
average payment was 14.9 euros, with payments ranging between 0 and 40
euros. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Table 2 reports summary statistics by treatment and player type. The
average amount sent by A players is 4.46 tokens in the NI-treatment (me-
dian=3). This suggests that players A are not driven purely by self-interest,
as they give almost 25 per cent of their endowment on average in the ab-
sence of extrinsic motivation. In the I-treatment the average amount sent by
players A is 7.63 tokens (median=6.5). The difference between the average
amounts sent by players A in the two treatments is statistically significant at
the five per cent level, using a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test for a two-sided
hypothesis based on 24 independent observations. This indicates that self-
interest also plays a substantial role in determining the decisions of players
A. Average responses by players B in strategy method are relatively similar
in the two treatments (6.41 and 5.77, respectively), whereas the difference
in actual decisions is much larger (5.29 and 2.79 in the NI- and I-treatment,
respectively). However, both for strategies and decisions the difference be-
tween the amounts sent by B-players in the two treatments is not statistically
significant, using a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test (p-values are 0.48 and 0.14,
respectively).12
Let us turn to the test of hypothesis 1. Table 3 reports correlation coeffi-
cients between the responses of B players and the amounts sent by A players,
within each treatment. If we consider the strategy profiles of B players (re-
sponses in strategy method), Spearman correlation coefficients are positive
and strongly significant within each of the two treatments (0.35 and 0.52
for the I- and NI-treatment, respectively). Similar results are obtained for
Pearson correlation coefficients (0.37 and 0.46 for the I- and NI-treatment,
12For responses in strategy method, in order to have independent observations we com-
puted the average amount sent by each B player and tested the null of no difference
between treatments on 24 independent observations.
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Table 2: Summary statistics of amounts sent, by player and treatment
Means Medians N.Obs.
Info No Info Info No Info
Amount sent by A 7.63 4.46 6.50 3.00 24
Amount sent by B (SM) 6.41 5.77 4.00 4.00 504
Amount sent by B (DM) 5.29 2.79 1.50 0.00 24
Note: Info = Information treatment. No Info = No Information treatment.
respectively).13 These results clearly indicate that players B’s strategies are
characterized by a concern for fairness.
Table 3: Reciprocity within treatments
Strategy method Decision method
Info No Info Info No Info
Spearman correlation 0.35** 0.52** 0.57** 0.76**
Pearson correlation 0.37** 0.46** 0.53* 0.70**
Note: Info = Information treatment. No Info = No Information treatment. Columns 1
and 2 report correlations for individual strategies, columns 3 and 4 report correlations
for individual decisions. * and ** indicate p-value <0.05 and <0.01, respectively, for a
two-sided null hypothesis of zero correlation. All tests are based on 24 independent
observations.
It could be observed that the positive relationship between the amounts
sent and received might be enhanced by the use of the strategy method:
given that players B are faced with a choice for each of the feasible actions of
players A, this might artificially lead to stronger correlations than if players
B were to make only one choice, in response to the single actual decision
made by A. It could also be argued, more generally, that since only 1 of the
21 feasible actions by players A has actually been chosen, the strategy profile
of players B as expressed in their SM choices does not necessarily represent
how they would respond to the actual choice of player A. We therefore also
report, in table 3, correlation coefficients for the responses of players B to the
actual amounts sent by players A (decision method), for the two treatments.
13In order to have independent observations we computed individual correlation coeffi-
cients by pairs of subjects, and tested the null hypothesis of zero correlation using a sign
test based on 24 independent observations.
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The correlation coefficients are, as in the previous case, positive and strongly
significant within each of the two treatments, and are indeed larger than in
the case of SM responses (0.57 and 0.76 for I- and NI-treatment, respectively).
Pearson correlations are 0.53 and 0.70, respectively, in the two treatments.
Result 1: The null hypothesis of absence of fairness concerns
for B subjects can be strongly rejected within each of the two
treatments, both for strategies and actual decisions.
The results in table 3 provide a qualitative indication that fairness is
elicited differently in the two treatments: correlation coefficients are larger
in the NI-treatment, where strategic motivations can be ruled out, than in
the I-treatment. We therefore turn to formal tests of hypothesis 2. We start
by analyzing individual behavior, then examine aggregate behavior using
regression analysis.
Since players B had to provide a response for each feasible action of players
A, we can study the differences in reciprocating behavior between the two
treatments at the individual level. Figure 2 displays the histogram of the
Spearman correlations in each of the two treatments, and the corresponding
cumulative distributions. Table 4 reports individual correlation coefficients
between the responses of B players and each of the possible amounts sent
by A players, for each of the two treatments. Both the table and the figure
indicate that individual correlations are larger in the NI-treatment.
Table 5 reports the results of the test of the null hypothesis that corre-
lation coefficients are the same in the two treatments. In particular, using
a t-test, the null hypothesis of equal means across treatments is rejected for
both Spearman and Pearson correlations (the p-value for a two-sided test
is 0.05). Using a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, as suggested by the nature
of the distribution of the correlation coefficients and the small sample size,
would lead to rejection of the equal median null hypothesis at the 20 per cent
significance level (the p-values for a two-sided test are 0.19 for the Spearman
correlation and 0.16 for the Pearson correlation coefficients, respectively).
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test-statistics do not lead to reject the null of equality
of distributions, but provide an indication that the distribution of correla-
tions in the NI-treatment dominates the corresponding distribution for the
I-treatment. These findings indicate that, at the individual level, reciprocity
is stronger in the NI-treatment.
Individual strategy profiles, reported in figures 3 and 4, help to inter-
pret this result: not only do subjects reciprocate more in the NI-treatment
16
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Info-treatment No Info-treatment
Pair 1 0.00 0.00
Pair 2 0.00 0.12
Pair 3 0.00 0.23
Pair 4 0.00 0.37
Pair 5 0.00 0.48*
Pair 6 0.00 0.74**
Pair 7 0.07 0.76**
Pair 8 0.17 0.78**
Pair 9 0.35 0.87**
Pair 10 0.61** 0.90**
Pair 11 0.61** 0.93**
Pair 12 0.68** 0.96**
Pair 13 0.84** 0.97**
Pair 14 0.92** 0.98**
Pair 15 0.94** 0.98**
Pair 16 0.95** 0.98**
Pair 17 0.99** 0.99**
Pair 18 0.99** 0.99**
Pair 19 1.00** 0.99**
Pair 20 1.00** 1.00**
Pair 21 1.00** 1.00**
Pair 22 1.00** 1.00**
Pair 23 1.00** 1.00**
Pair 24 1.00** 1.00**
Note: I = Information treatment. NI = No Information treatment. The figures reported
are Spearman rank correlation coefficients, sorted by size, between the amount received
and the amount sent by B players in strategy method. * and ** indicate p-value <0.05
and <0.01, respectively.
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Table 5: Test for differences in distributions of correlations
T-stat P-val U-stat P-val KS-stat P-val
Spearman correlation -1.88 0.05 -1.28 0.19 0.29 0.26
Pearson correlation -1.86 0.05 -1.43 0.16 0.29 0.26
Note: the table reports results of alternative tests of the null hypothesis that average
correlation coefficients are the same in the Information treatment and the
No-Information treatment.
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on average, but also a larger fraction of the subjects do not display any re-
ciprocal behavior when strategic motivations cannot be ruled out. In the
I-treatment, 6 out of 24 players B display an unconditional strategy profile
(zero correlation with player A’s decision), as opposed to only 1 out of 24 in
the NI-treatment.
Figure 3: Individual responses of players B (SM): I-treatment
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Let us now turn to aggregate behavior. We start by examining whether
there are any systematic differences in how subjects respond in strategy and
decision method in the two treatments. Table 6 reports regression results for
the relationship between B players’ actual decisions and their strategies: B’s
responses in DM are regressed by OLS on B’s responses in SM corresponding
to the same amount given by A. We also include a dummy variable for the
NI-treatment and an interaction term to assess the differences between the
two treatments. The results indicate that strategies explain about 60 per
cent of the overall variability of decisions, and that choices in the decision
method were more selfish than in the strategy method in both treatments (co-
efficient estimates are 0.73 and 0.94 in the Information and No-Information
treatments, respectively). The difference in the coefficients between the two
treatments indicates that decisions follow strategies more closely in the NI-
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Figure 4: Individual responses of players B (SM): NI-treatment
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treatment. However the estimated difference is not statistically significant
(the corresponding t-statistic is 1.04). This indicates that there are no sys-
tematic differences in how subjects respond in strategy and decision method
in the two treatments, thus providing support for the use of the strategy
method.
Table 7 reports the results obtained by regressing the SM response of B
players on A players’ action, using observations from both treatments. We
define a kind response for players B as sending a positive number of to-
kens, and an unkind response as sending zero tokens, so that the dependent
variable is a dummy variable equal to 0 if b = 0 and equal to 1 if b > 0. Pa-
rameter estimates are obtained using a probit estimator, and test statistics
are based on errors clustered on pairs of subjects. We also include among
the explanatory variables a dummy variable for the NI-treatment and an in-
teraction term (action by A players multiplied by the NI-treatment dummy).
This allows us to assess the differences in reciprocating behavior between the
two treatments at the aggregate level.
We consider two specifications. In the first, the explanatory variable is the
number of tokens sent by player A in stage 1. The results, reported in column
20
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Table 6: Regressions of B’s responses on B’s strategies
Response by B (DM)
B’s strategy 0.73**
(6.41)
B’s strategy * NI-treatment dummy 0.21
(1.04)
NI-treatment dummy -1.63
(-1.18)
Constant 1.40
(1.40)
R-squared 0.61
Number of observations 48
Note: OLS estimates. t-statistics reported in brackets. * and ** indicate p-value <0.05
and <0.01, respectively. I = Information treatment. NI = No Information treatment.
(1), indicate that the probability that B players respond kindly depends
positively on the number of tokens received in stage 1. The coefficient for
the interaction term is positive and strongly significant (t-statistic=2.69),
consistently with the hypothesis that reciprocal behavior is stronger in the
NI-treatment. In the second specification, the explanatory variable is defined
as a dummy variable, equal to 1 if A sends a positive number of tokens and 0
otherwise. The results, reported in column (2), indicate that the probability
that B players respond kindly is significantly higher if player A’s action in
stage 1 was kind. As above, the coefficient for the interaction term is positive,
although only marginally significant (the t-statistic is 1.61). Overall, these
results indicate that also at the aggregate level reciprocal behavior is stronger
in the NI-treatment.
Result 2: The positive relationship between the amounts sent
and received is stronger in the NI-treatment than in the I-treatment,
both at aggregate and individual level.
6 Discussion
This paper presented an experimental investigation of the hypothesis that
the motivations driving an action matter for its perceived kindness and, as
21
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Table 7: Regressions of B’s responses to A’s actions (SM)
(1) (2)
Amount sent by A (dummy) 1.65**
(4.75)
Amount sent by A (dummy) * NI-treatment dummy 0.80*
(1.61)
Amount sent by A 0.04**
(3.12)
Amount sent by A * NI dummy 0.10**
(2.69)
NI-treatment dummy -0.18 -0.15
(-0.40) (-0.53)
Constant -0.97** 0.18
(-3.14) (0.90)
Pseudo-R2 0.14 0.15
Number of observations 1008 1008
Note: Dependent variable: SM response by B subjects, defined as 0 if b = 0 and 1 if
b > 0. Probit estimates, t-statistics reported in brackets (standard errors clustered on
pairs of subjects). * and ** indicate p-value <0.05 and <0.01, respectively. I =
Information treatment, NI = No Information treatment.
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a consequence, for the reciprocal response to that action. In particular, we
tested the hypothesis that, for a given distributional outcome, an action is
perceived to be less kind if it is strategically motivated than if it is not
strategically motivated. In order to test this hypothesis, we proposed a new
experimental design, based on a symmetric gift-exchange game, that allows
us to manipulate the beliefs of the first mover about the strategy space of
the second mover.
The results of the experiment indicate that when strategic motivations of
the first mover can be ruled out, second movers’ responses are characterized
by stronger positive reciprocity. This result holds for both strategy profiles
and actual decisions. The results at the individual level indicate, in partic-
ular, that a larger fraction of the subjects display unconditional behavior
when strategic motivations cannot be ruled out.
These findings suggest several implications and directions for future re-
search. First, at the theoretical level, concerns for fairness cannot be ex-
plained entirely by distributional factors. Intention-based reciprocity also
matters. In particular, theoretical models of reciprocal behavior should take
into account explicitly the type of motivation driving the action an agent
is responding to. An action may elicit reciprocity differently depending on
whether it is perceived as strategically motivated or not. At the empirical
level, the perceived kindness of an action can be assessed not only on the
basis of the strategy space of the first mover, but also on the beliefs of the
first mover about the strategy space of the second mover.
Second, our results can be interpreted as providing an inter-personal ex-
tension of the concept of motivational crowding-out (e.g. Deci and Ryan,
2000). Motivational crowding-out is defined as the reduction of effort in
activities carried out for intrinsic motivation when an instrumental reward,
typically monetary, is introduced.14 Several studies have documented the ex-
istence of motivational crowding-out (e.g. Cameron and Pierce, 1996, Eisen-
berger and Cameron, 1996, Deci et al., 2000, Deci and Ryan, 2000).15 Self
14“Intrinsic motivation is defined as the doing of an activity for its inherent satisfactions
rather than for some separable consequence. When intrinsically motivated a person is
moved to act for the fun or challenge entailed rather than because of external prods,
pressures, or rewards. [...] Extrinsic motivation is a construct that pertains whenever an
activity is done in order to attain some separable outcome”, Deci and Ryan (2000, p. 56).
The role of intrinsic motivation for optimal incentive contracts was examined by Kreps
(1997) and Murdock (2002). See also the review in Lindenberg (2001).
15Frey (1997) examines the reduction of the effort of intrinsically motivated workers
23
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Determination Theory explains this phenomenon using the concept of con-
trol (Deci and Ryan, 1985): extrinsic reward is perceived as a form of control
and, in intrinsically motivated people, it can reduce effort. Existing stud-
ies of motivational crowding-out have generally investigated differences in
the behavior of one agent motivated by either intrinsic or extrinsic rewards.
Our results indicate that the extrinsic motivation driving the action of an
agent may have a crowding out effect on the intrinsically motivated economic
behavior of another agent.
A third implication is related to the power of disinterested philanthropy
in eliciting reciprocity in helped people (Margalit, 1996): is free riding less
strong when people are engaged in mutual advantageous actions (like con-
tracts), or when the helped person feels disinterested motivation in her part-
ner? In other words, in a “Samaritan dilemma” (Buchanan, 1975), does gra-
tuity induce more or less reciprocity than a contract (without enforcement)?
Our experiment suggests that disinterested gifts elicit more reciprocity.
A final implication refers to interpersonal relationships, in particular
within organizations. The literature on motivational crowding-out indicates
that the introduction of extrinsic incentives in domains where intrinsic mo-
tivation are relevant can reduce effort and efficiency. If disinterested costly
actions generate relatively more reciprocity, then it could be more efficient
in workplaces, for instance, to manage interpersonal relations not only by
means of contracts and incentives, but also to leave some room for gratuity
as a way to stimulate reciprocity and, as a consequence, cooperation. This
would apply, in particular, to those domains where stakeholders ask for in-
trinsic motivation, such as value-based organizations, the non-profit sector,
or caring.
when extrinsic rewards are introduced. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) explore the effects
of motivational crowding-out in an experiment on fund-raising. At the theoretical level,
Harvey (2005) explains motivational crowding out within a principal-agent model where
utility is interpreted as overall satisfaction.
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7 Appendix: Instructions
This appendix reports the instructions distributed on paper to the subjects.
Paragraph headings indicate in brackets if the given subsection is common
to both treatments or is specific to the relevant treatment.
Instructions [common to both treatments]
• Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment.
• During the experiment you are not allowed to talk or communicate in
any way with other participants. If at any time you have any questions
raise your hand and one of the assistants will come to you to answer it.
• By following the instructions carefully you can earn an amount of
money that will depend on your choices and the choices of other par-
ticipants.
• At the end of the experiment the tokens that you have earned will
be converted in euros at the exchange rate 2 tokens = 1 euro. The
resulting amount will be paid to you in cash.
General rules [common to both treatments]
• There are 24 subjects participating in this experiment.
• At the beginning of the experiment 12 couples of two participants will
be formed randomly and anonymously. Within each couple, the two
subjects will be randomly assigned two different roles: A and B.
• Therefore, each subject will interact exclusively with the other subject
in her pair, without knowing her/her identity, and will have the role (A
or B) assigned to him with equal probability at the beginning of the
experiment.
How players interact [NI-treatment]
• Both A and B will receive an endowment of 20 tokens each.
• Player A will have to decide how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to
send to player B.
25
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• We will triple the amount sent, so that B will receive 3 tokens for each
token sent by A.
• Therefore:
– A will obtain 20 tokens minus the tokens sent to B;
– B will obtain 20 tokens plus 3 times the tokens sent by A.
How players interact [I-treatment]
• Both A and B will receive an endowment of 20 tokens each.
The experiment will take place in 2 phases.
• PHASE 1
– Player A will have to decide how many tokens (between 0 and 20)
to send to player B.
– We will triple the amount sent, so that B will receive 3 tokens for
each token sent by A.
• PHASE 2
– Subject B, having been informed of the amount sent to him by
Player A in phase 1, will have to decide how many tokens (between
0 and 20) to send to player A.
– We will triple the amount sent, so that A will receive 3 tokens for
each token sent by B.
• Therefore, in total:
– A will obtain 20 tokens minus the tokens sent to B in phase 1 plus
3 times the tokens sent by B in phase 2.
– B will obtain 20 tokens plus 3 times the tokens sent by A in phase
1 minus the tokens sent to A in phase 2.
26
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Instructions - phase 2 [common to both treatments]
• B has to decide how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to send to A,
who sent a certain amount of tokens to B in phase 1.
• We will triple the amount sent, so that A will receive 3 tokens for each
token sent by B.
• The choice of how many tokens B wants to send to A will be made with
two different methods:
– Method 1: before being informed of how many tokens A sent to B
in phase 1, B has to decide how many tokens she wants to send
to A for each of the possible amounts that A could have sent to
him (0, 1, ..., 20 tokens). Since there are 21 possible cases, B has
to make 21 choices.
– Method 2: after being informed of how many tokens A actually
sent to B in phase 1, B has to decide how many tokens she wants
to send to A.
• After B players have made their choice with both methods, earnings
will be determined on the basis of one of the two methods, selected
randomly.
– If method 1 is selected, of the 21 choices that B had made, only
the one corresponding to the actual decision of A will be used to
determine the earnings.
– If method 2 is selected, the single choice that B had made will be
used to determine the earnings.
The experiment will end and overall earnings for each subject will be
determined as the sum of the earnings obtained in phase 1 and in phase 2.
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